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Foundational to HCI is the notion of “the user.” Whether a 
cognitive processor, social actor, consumer, or even a non-
user, the user in HCI has always been as much a technical 
construct as actual people using systems. We explore an 
emerging formulation of the user—the subjectivity of in-
formation—by laying out what it means and why research-
ers are being drawn to it. We then use it to guide a case 
study of a relatively marginal use of computing—digitally 
mediated sexuality—to holistically explore design in rela-
tion to embodiment, tactual experience, sociability, power, 
ideology, selfhood, and activism. We argue that subjectiv-
ities of information clarifies the relationships between de-
sign choices and embodied experiences, ways that designers 
design users and not just products, and ways to cultivate 
and transform, rather than merely support, human agency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A decennial conference beckons us to reflect with a wider 
perspective than our everyday research often affords. We 
reflect in this paper on the ways that HCI has theorized the 
user. We begin in the early 1980s, when notions of “usabil-
ity” and “user-centered design” were first consolidating a 
notion of the user—one that would quickly be criticized and 
reworked, beginning an ongoing activity that continues to-
day. We will turn our attention to an emerging formulation 
in HCI of the user that is informed by recent philosophy: 
the user as a subjectivity of information. After characteriz-
ing what this formulation means, we then seek to test it. We 
do so by investigating a marginal use of computing, digi-
tally mediated sexuality. We choose this use because it 
brings onto the same stage a diverse range of concerns that 
HCI is increasingly seeking to take on: design, embodi-
ment, tactual experience, sociability, power, ideology, self-
hood, and activism. Sexuality has also centrally figured in 
theorizing subjectivity in the humanities. Using critical and 
empirical methods, we explore sexual subjectivity as de-
signed, and reflect back on the benefits and limits of subjec-
tivities of information as a formulation of computing use. 
USER AND SUBJECT 
Although at first blush “the user” might seem to be very 
obvious in its meaning—it’s the person who is using a sys-
tem!—in fact HCI researchers and practitioners operate 
with evolving understandings that have been informed for 
years by technical understandings, grounded in epistemo-
logical, ethical, and methodological commitments. Even the 
following brief survey makes this clear. In their 1983 clas-
sic, Card, Moran, and Newell [8] characterize the user thus: 
a scientific psychology should help us in arranging this 
interface so it is easy, efficient, error-free—even enjoy-
able…. The key notion is that the user and the computer 
engage in a communicative dialogue whose purpose is 
the accomplishment of some task…. The human mind is 
also an information processing system. (pp.1, 4, 24) 
In 1985 Gould and Lewis [16] proposed a three-part meth-
odology for systems design: an early focus on users, em-
pirical measurements, and iterative design. And in 1988, 
Norman [26] advised, “make sure that (1) the user can fig-
ure out what to do, and (2) the user can tell what is going 
on” (p.188). Common to these is the user understood as an 
individual completing a task with a system, where the hu-
man is abstracted as a cognitive processor well defined 
needs; tasks are understood as behavioral sequences that 
can be explicitly defined; and interaction is understood as a 
dialogue between this cognitive processer and the task 
needing to be done—and all of the above were available to 
and measurable by empirical methods.  
But it was not long before these formulations were critiqued 
and expanded. In 1986 and 1987, respectively, Winograd 
and Flores [46] and Suchman [40] challenged the view of 
the human constructed by these earlier notions of the user, 
leveraging philosophy to rethink what it means to act in a 
situation. Bannon & Bødker [1] wrote that in classic HCI, 
the user had been “hacked into” a “disembodied ratiocina-
tor,” referring to cognitive modeling disengaged from social 
and material praxis. Kuutti [22] and Cockton [10] would 
later trace three HCI “users” emerging in the research dis-
course from the 1980s to the 2000s: the user as source of 
error, as social actor, and as consumer, broadly correspond-
ing to changes in computing paradigms over the decades, 
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from one-user-one-terminal systems, towards systems sup-
porting workplace cooperation, and finally towards experi-
ence-oriented systems. More recent work has added the 
“non-user” to the mix as well [31]. 
More radically, Cooper & Bowers [11] analyzed “the user” 
as a discursive structure, rather than an actual person: 
The representation of the user [in HCI discourses] can be 
analytically broken down into three constituent and mu-
tually dependent moments [as follows…] In the first, the 
user is created as a new discursive object that is to be 
HCI’s concern […] In the second, HCI tends to construct 
cognitive representations of the user […] In the third, 
HCI represents the user in the political sense of ‘repre-
sentation’: as Landauer puts it, people within HCI should 
be the ‘advocates of the interests of users’. [p.50] 
The present work continues this thinking, analyzing the us-
er in relation to abstract structural positions or roles that are 
inhabited by actual people using systems in real situations.  
Situated Actors and/or Structured Roles 
The key conceptual move is to distinguish the user qua an 
individual person—an embodied actor in a given situa-
tion—from the user qua structural roles, with anticipated 
needs and capabilities. We make this move because the 
former—the user qua embodied individual—maps (perhaps 
too intuitively) onto everyday notions of persons as already 
given: that is, that the individual is already there, and our 
job as designers is to support that individual in achieving a 
need. What the latter—the user qua structural role—gives 
us is not only a type of individual whom we can support, 
but also an analytic means to think about designing the role 
itself, i.e., designing not just the system but also the user. 
(We believe that designers already design both systems and 
users, but some HCI theory, fusing with ordinary language 
notions of personhood, obfuscates that we also design the 
user—consider, again, how most will parse Norman’s dic-
tum: “make sure that the user can figure out what to do….”) 
Our argument is that to resist the analytical conflation of 
situated actors and discursive constructs into “the user,” 
that we should analyze “the user” as a “subjectivity of in-
formation,” that is, structural roles that are designable and 
designed, which users-as-situated-actors take up and per-
form. In what follows, we will argue that such a view has 
practical advantages for HCI researchers and designers, as 
well as important methodological implications. 
Subjectivities of Information 
The concept of subjectivity is derived from the philosophy 
of Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Delueze & Guattari, Butler, 
and others. Two related concepts are at the core of this the-
ory: the notion of subject positions, which are social roles 
that people are thrust into, and subjectivity, which is the felt 
experience and creative agency of individuals within that 
situation. Subject positions are typically relational, that is, 
requiring another: teacher-student, mother-daughter, police-
citizen, designer-user. Subjectivities are more diverse and 
situated: two students can occupy the same subject position 
and yet perform distinctly different behaviors and attitudes. 
A subject position thus constrains possible behaviors, atti-
tudes, etc., but it also provides generative “rules” for crea-
tive, stylized, and individual performances within them. 
Any individual occupies many different subject positions: a 
schoolchild is also a daughter, a citizen, a goalie, etc. Sub-
ject positions can come into conflict, thus shaping (and 
helping explain) how an individual negotiates them.  
We can apply this concept to computer use. Common IT 
subject positions include power users, novices, early adopt-
ers, and non-users; social actors; gamers, trolls, and n00bs; 
standard users and admins; expert amateurs and everyday 
designers; quantified selves; makers and hackers; social 
media friends; and many more. It is clear that all of these 
positions comprise both technical and social roles. The con-
cept of subjectivities gets at how these roles are diversely 
enacted, embodied, or performed. For example, we under-
stand how step- and calorie-counting apps construct quanti-
fied self subject positions, but how those apps are subjec-
tively experienced (e.g., as a source of empowerment, anxi-
ety, and/or curiosity) and how they are enacted or stylized 
(e.g., integrated into one’s lifestyle, displayed and/or hidden 
from the view of others) is a different type of question. Sub-
ject positions are analytically available to research, while 
subjectivities are empirically available.  
We understand subjectivity of information to refer to any 
combination of (structural) subject positions and (felt and 
performed) subjectivities relevant to the context of informa-
tion technology use. We do not mean to reify a subjectivity 
of information as somehow distinct or independent from 
other subjectivities. We simply understand the concept in 
its usual theoretical sense, applied in the domain of IT de-
sign and use. That is, we seek to understand “users” insofar 
as they are structurally subjected to certain IT systems and 
associated social practices, and how they become subjects 
of (i.e., agents of) those systems and social practices. These 
are analytically distinct from “users” as commonsense per-
sons because a given person can inhabit multiple subject 
positions and can experience/perform them not only differ-
ently from other individuals, but even differently from 
themselves at different times or in different situations. 
We argue that the notion of subjectivities of information 
has three benefits. It can give us a tighter analytic coupling 
between specific design decisions and particular social ex-
periences, because the design decisions and social experi-
ences can both be analyzed using an analytic vocabulary 
common to both, i.e., the structures that comprise that sub-
ject position, understood as an amalgam of computational 
rules and social structures, including rights and responsibili-
ties, laws, mores, etc. Second, it makes clear that we can 
(and do) design subjects as well as interfaces, products, and 
services (while recalling that the parallel concept of subjec-
tivities means that individuals have plenty of agency be-
yond what we can prescribe as subject positions). And fi-
nally, such a view supports design practices aimed at culti-
vating and transforming, rather than merely supporting or 
extending, human agency; one use of subjectivity in critical 
theory has been to serve activist purposes, to imagine and 
pursue the transformation of society.  
Methodologies for Information Subjectivities  
The user as subjectivity of information has methodological 
implications, because “the subject” is shaped by sociotech-
nical structures that include individual algorithms and sys-
tem structures (e.g., permissions, task sequences), and also 
social structures, including shared practices, intersubjective 
understandings, policies, and broader sociological struc-
tures including gender, racial, and class ideologies. As such, 
the subject is not a simple given, and cannot be rendered 
available to understanding merely with data, but rather it 
must be interpreted, a critical activity that makes sense of 
multiple sources, including systems, empirical studies of 
users, and analysis of data—all of which can be supported 
by relevant theories. One methodological challenge, then, 
becomes how we weigh differing theoretical, data, and cri-
tique-based resources in interpreting the subject.  
Adapting from feminist film theory [43], we can distinguish 
three sources of the subject: cultural objects (i.e., interac-
tive technologies for our purposes) that express expecta-
tions about their ideal user who will get the most out of 
them; actual users, who have their own experiences, pur-
poses, and perspectives about their use of an object; and 
researchers/critics, who offer a trained expert perspective 
on objects. Most research only accesses one or two of these 
positions. For example, if a work of interaction criticism 
[2,5] asserts that a system manipulates users, two of the 
three positions are active—the critic and the inscribed 
user—but not the second (actual users). When HCI re-
searchers study the actual aesthetic judgments that users 
make (e.g., [41]), they are activating the second but not the 
first and third positions.  
Once we acknowledge these three positions, another re-
search challenge comes into focus: they often do not agree. 
The “actual” meaning of the design, then, must be some ne-
gotiation of these different positions. A methodological 
strategy proposed by feminist researchers to study subjec-
tivity has been to deploy a critical-empirical approach. For 
example, in a landmark study of romance novels, feminist 
literary critic Janice Radway [29] read the romance novel 
genre as patriarchal (because it offers narratives that reas-
sure and satisfy women while preserving an unequal status 
quo), and then she ethnographically studied working class 
women readers. Not surprisingly, their literary understand-
ings did not agree. The dilemma for Radway, then, is this: 
as a scholar trained in feminist theory, Radway is in a posi-
tion to see “false pleasures” that everyday readers may not 
be able or want to see; one cannot dismiss Radway’s read-
ing simply because the everyday readers did not see things 
the way she did. But as a feminist, Radway must acknowl-
edge and contend with the value that actual women find in 
these texts.  
Radway’s dilemma is HCI’s as well: if researchers cede the 
authority of identifying the sociotechnical significances of 
systems to actual users, we risk overlooking to the very 
subtle roles of ideology and false pleasure in systems, an 
approach that is ultimately regressive. If HCI researchers 
instead become more active critics, we risk speaking for 
users, substituting our own values for theirs. Thus we be-
lieve something akin to the methodology that Radway 
sought to undertake, which stages a dialogue between 
equally weighted critical and empirical studies of the same 
phenomenon, might be an appropriate strategy for investi-
gating the meanings of interactive products—and the sub-
ject positions and subjectivities inscribed within them.  
A CRITICAL-EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL 
SEXUAL SUBJECTS 
The shift to envisioning users as sociotechnical subjects is 
anything but new: it is the outcome of a generation of re-
search and theory throughout HCI, explored in CSCW, par-
ticipatory design, in traditional user research, and so on (see 
e.g., [12]; the term “subjectivities of information” itself was 
coined by Paul Dourish). Because we see analysis of socio-
technical subjects as involving (at least) three planes of 
meaning (i.e., the values and subject positions inscribed in 
designs; the skilled practices of actual users; and the cri-
tique of domain experts), we undertook a research initiative 
that engages all three.  
The research focuses on a paradigmatic change that began 
about a decade ago in sex toy design. Prior to it, sex toy de-
sign was linked to the porn industry, marketed to men, 
manufactured cheaply, and called “novelty products” to 
avoid regulation under medical standards. Since then, the 
industry has been transformed by designers with back-
grounds in high-end industrial design, including Apple, Er-
icsson, Frog Design, and so on; the toys are manufactured 
according to the standards of modern consumer electronics 
(e.g., MP3 players) and in most cases using medical grade, 
body-safe materials; they are marketed to women as luxury 
accessories; their price point is generally higher and in 
some cases much higher; and they align themselves with 
feminist sex positive activists who seek to transform the 
meanings and consequences of sexual body practices (see 
[3]). Broader cultural meanings of sex toys also changed in 
this time, with episodes of television shows, such as Sex & 
the City, presenting them in a positive light.  
Our overall research program on sex and HCI has included 
an interview study with sex toy designers and feminist sex 
activists, critical analysis of sex toys, and empirical studies 
of digitally mediated sexual life in virtual worlds, on social 
media, and with digital sex toys. Some of this research has 
been reported elsewhere [3], so we focus here on a critical-
empirical study of sex toys and their sexual subjectivities. 
In conducting this research, we are able to focus on the in-
terrelations of critical and empirical epistemologies for de-
sign and user research, and we use this as an opportunity to 
better understood subjectivity holistically in its designed, 
technological, embodied, political, and social dimensions.  
Theory Background: Sex and the Subject 
Studies of sexuality in HCI have increased since 2005, al-
beit sometimes in the face of resistance, which, along with 
dominant social norms, often wants to bracket sexuality 
aside irrelevant to computing, usability, and software de-
sign, except for very narrowly construed sexual technolo-
gies. But sexuality researchers in health sciences [18], soci-
ology [6,33,38], philosophy [4,30,36], and the fine arts [45] 
offer a different point of view, one in which sexuality is not 
compartmentalized but rather is a basic aspect of our social 
life, body knowledge, and body habits. Attention to sexual-
ity allows us to recuperate “a range of often discounted or 
forgotten social actors, movements, and landscapes” [15]. 
Our research program leverages two related ideas from this 
literature and explore their applicability to HCI: sexual so-
ciability and sexual subjectivity. 
Sexual sociability. Sexuality is not merely a private, but it 
also has an outward-turning dimension. Yet, physical 
pleasures are commonly assumed to be private and even 
antisocial. Philosopher Richard Shusterman challenges this 
view: “Most pleasure,” he writes, “does not have the char-
acter of a specific, narrowly localized body feeling (unlike a 
toothache or stubbed toe). The pleasure of playing tennis 
cannot be identified in one’s running feet, beating heart, or 
swing of the racket hand” [36, p.41]. Shusterman adds that 
“Feeling bien dans sa peau can make us more comfortably 
open in dealing with others” [36, p. 41]. Shusterman tightly 
couples physical pleasure and social competence as insepa-
rable aspects of human body practices, and he concludes 
that we should cultivate, rather than repress, our capacity to 
experience socio-physical pleasure. This contrasts with tra-
ditional morality, in which sexual pleasures are seen as self-
ish and antisocial, exemplified by the myth, frequently cri-
tiqued by sex educators, that vibrators are fine for when one 
is alone, but not when one is in a relationship [34]. On the 
sociability of sexuality, psychotherapist Horrocks writes, 
I construct my sexual identity not simply to obtain pleas-
ure or love, but also to communicate who I am…. But I 
do not exist simply as an individual: the reason I am able 
to use sexuality in this complex manner is because I take 
part in a socialized sexual system” [18, p.191] 
This social view of sex is mainstream in the scholarly 
community. It stresses that characteristics deemed “natural” 
about sex are in fact historically contingent and hegemonic 
[33]. The scholarly view has deep ethical implications:  
[In] erotic life, we experience our bodies as the locus of 
the communication between us, and the site of our an-
swerability to each other’s perspective…. Sexuality is not 
‘animal,’ and it is not ‘amoral.’ It is … the originary ma-
trix of interpersonal humanity and responsibility…. Erot-
ic experience is experiencing the other as a person in and 
through experiencing oneself as a person. The epiphany 
of the other is the foundation of ethics [30, pp.76, 85] 
Sexual subjectivity. Part of the process of socio-sexual ma-
turity is acquiring skills of sexual perception. Sexual per-
ception is skilled, because it must be learned, and it is me-
diated by our learning of related conceptual vocabularies 
[39]. For example, a discriminating palette for tasting wine 
requires not just tasting many different wines but also de-
veloping a conceptual vocabulary to name the distinctions 
that one learns to perceive (e.g., notes of oak, chalkiness, 
cherry; the mouthfeel, the finish). For Shusterman, sensory 
pleasure, aesthetic appreciation, and the formation of the 
self are all contingent on one’s skill with one’s body. We 
develop our body skills through training, understood as “ac-
tually engaging in programs of disciplined, reflective, cor-
poreal practice aimed at somatic self-improvement” [37], 
including diets, exercise programs, and erotic arts. From 
Cosmo to The Joy of Sex, there is plenty of evidence that 
millions cultivate their sexual abilities. 
Sexuality research helps us understand the interrelations 
among a complex set of tactual and social skills, body-body 
interactions, and body habits. HCI, CSCW, and ubiquitous 
computing research is already taking up such themes. To 
them we add that the embodied subject of interaction is 
gendered and sexual all the time, not just in the bedroom. It 
is only through such a formulation that we can begin to hear 
the voices of sexual subjects: “Those who have been mar-
ginalized, oppressed and pathologized begin to speak, begin 
to make their own demands, begin to describe their own 
lives, not in a spirit of scientific objectivity, but with pas-
sion, indignation, and exhalation” [18, p.187].  
Critical-Empirical Methodology 
For this study, we deployed both a critical analysis of sex 
toys and an empirical investigation of how different people 
react to them, partly in hopes of better understanding how 
these two planes of meaning related to one another, and 
specifically to understand how sexual subjectivities are pro-
jected by, and how they contribute to an understanding of, 
these toys.  
Critical analysis. We offer an expert analysis of five of the 
toys used in the empirical portion of the study, three recog-
nized as in the “designerly” paradigm and two from the ear-
lier paradigm. From that analysis we produce an interpreta-
tion that helps us understand the ways that this new genera-
tion of sex toys inscribed within its toys a new (to sex toys, 
if not to discourse) sexual subjectivity. We use critique in 
the same ways it is used in the humanities, i.e., as an inter-
pretative activity that seeks to accomplish some combina-
tion of the following: to provide a value judgment sup-
ported with reasons and evidence and to help a particular 
audience or public appreciate (dis)value in works of the cul-
tural domain [9]; to reveal values and assumptions inscribed 
in works and subject them to interrogation [19]; to account 
for a work’s most general organization and the ways that it 
“presents its subject matter as a focus for thought and atten-
tion” [13]. We refined this general activity to generate a set 
of critical prompts (summarized below), by leveraging the 
sexuality and subjectivity theories introduced above.  
Empirical analysis. This portion of the study was lab-
based, in which subjects interacted with 15 different sex 
toys chosen, in consultation with an AASECT-certified sex 
educator, to represent the range of toys available, when the 
toys were purchased. Subjects participated in two activities: 
a self-guided talk-aloud exploration of the 15 toys over the 
course of roughly 20-30 minutes, followed up by a semi-
structured interview lasting 15-30 minutes. 17 study ses-
sions were conducted with a total of 25 subjects in 9 indi-
vidual sessions and 8 done in pairs, at their preference. The 
subject population consists of 9 male and 16 female, 22 to 
33 years of age. 11 of the subjects identify themselves as 
heterosexual, 10 as homosexual, and 3 as queer/other, and 
22 out of the 25 total subjects have prior experience with 
sex toys. Sessions were video-recorded with subjects’ per-
mission; afterwards, the audio from the video sessions was 
transcribed, and videos were used to annotate the transcrip-
tions to clarify what was going on (e.g., which toy a partici-
pant was talking about when not obvious from the audio).  
We acknowledge that lab-based interactions with 15 sex 
toys do not provide the same insight that in-the-wild-based 
interactions would. Because we obviously could not ob-
serve and interview participants during sex with each of the 
toys, we pursued this as a practical alternative. That said, 
given the expansive view of sexuality that we have just 
summarized—one that comprises much more than actual 
sexual acts and sees it instead as a basis for sociality and 
perception—we also believed that participants would not 
“turn off” their sexualities in the lab. That many of them 
brought their sexual partners, used language of sexual at-
traction/repulsion during the study, and linked their percep-
tions of these toys with prior experiences—all provide evi-
dence that this is true. Moreover, the Kinsey Institute—one 
of the most renowned sexuality research labs in the world—
conducts most of its studies in labs, for the same reasons. 
So while we do not provide data concerning reports of sex-
ual acts with these toys, we do have reason to believe that 
our subjects engaged these toys as sexual subjects.  
THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Our critical goal in this project is to offer an interpretation 
about how designs propose relationships between technol-
ogy and the body-as-subject in sexually specific ways—
organized around a sexual subjectivity. To interpret the de-
signs on these terms, we began our analyses of each toy 
with three orienting questions: How might one characterize 
this as an object? What are the product features, semantics, 
functions; what does this design claim as pleasure and what 
does it ask users to give up; in what ways is it precise? How 
does the product design subjects? What agencies are 
granted or constrained; how do toys assert a relationship to 
the human body; what demands on perception does the toy 
make; what subject positions are implied? What sociocul-
tural contingencies are expressed as norms in these toys? 
What would likely happen if a friend or parent discovered 
it; in what ways does the toy reflect, reify, or resist attitudes 
toward sex and issues of sexual social justice; in what ways 
are social relationships inscribed?  
The five toys we analyzed (Fig. 1) are from left to right, the 
OhMiBod Freestyle, a wireless vibrator that converts MP3 
audio into vibration patterns; the Jimmyjane Form 6, a jelly 
bean-shaped vibrator; the VixSkin Johnny, a non-vibrating 
dildo that simulates in detail a penis; the Maximus Power 
Stoker Viper, a vibrating penis sleeve; and Nomi Tang’s 
Better Than Chocolate, a clitoral vibrator with a touch-
sensitive UI. Following industry experts, we divide these 
toys into two groups. Freestyle, Form 6, and Better Than 
Chocolate all represent the “designerly” turn in sex toys, 
which brought about the dramatic change in the industry. 
Johnny and Maximus represent the earlier era. They range 
from USD $90-$185, so all might be seen as on the high-
end of the mainstream commercial spectrum.  
Group 1: “Designerly” Sex Toys 
OhMiBod Freestyle. The Freestyle’s distinctive feature is 
its wireless connectivity to an iPod, so that the audio signals 
from the iPod can be converted into vibrations: the idea is 
that the user masturbates with it to music. Its physical form 
is abstract and inorganic. Its shape is geometrically cylin-
drical, and it is symmetrical along its axes. At 21cm, it is 
considerably longer than the average human penis length, 
which is 12-13cm. The silver band that visually separates 
the handle end (i.e., the end that one holds, which also fea-
tures the UI and the electrical jack) has no anatomic ana-
logue, and it is clearly branded and contains UI icons of its 
own. The visual language of the Freestyle is that of a con-
sumer electronic at least as much as it is of the penis.  
The penis-like form, its size, and the iPod connectivity all 
suggest that OhMiBod is targeted at a solo female—solo 
because of the personal music player, female because of its 
pink color and form suitable for clitoral or vaginal massage. 
It literalizes cultural links between pop music and sexuality. 
The success of the device largely depends on the music one 
selects; beyond personal preferences, we noticed that music 
 
Figure 1. The five toys that were critiqued 
 
with a well defined beat produces a more structured vibra-
tion massage than music without. But the design also asks 
its users to give up something: social intimacy with a part-
ner, because it invites its user to retreat into a private world 
of personal music and individual genital pleasure. By asso-
ciating itself with iPods and consumer electronics, it also 
asserts itself as a middle class product, hip and youthful. In 
categorizing itself as another iPod-like device, it denies 
stigmas about sex and specifically masturbation. 
Jimmyjane Form 6. This design is like the Freestyle in its 
color and consumer electronic aesthetic. But Form 6 is am-
biguously shaped, not clearly resembling a body part nor 
obviously intended to couple with any particular body part. 
Its curvy asymmetrical shape connotes without denoting the 
organic. Form 6 is all about ambiguity, with its two motors, 
nearly invisible controls, lack of any obvious grip or han-
dle, and diverse affordances. The larger end is large, heavy, 
and powerful enough to serve as a non-erotic massager, 
e.g., for the back. It also has rounded ridges running along 
its length, which do not in any literal sense represent penile 
ridges, but they add an organic look-feel and suggest that 
they might feel good when the product is inserted and ro-
tated; the ridges also make it easier to hold, which is impor-
tant for a device that is likely to have lubricant on it.  
At USD $185, the Form 6 is by far the most expensive of 
the six toys we critiqued. It is full featured and heavy, con-
noting product quality. Its price, weight, formal ambiguity, 
and pretentious name all connote luxury and taste: this toy 
suggests that sex is valuable enough to invest in, both fi-
nancially and imaginatively. It demands of the user suffi-
cient imagination to try it out in different places and differ-
ent ways. But it also asks its user to give something up: its 
pampered, sensual, refined sexuality is intimate like a bub-
ble bath, and it thereby resists the raunchy and gritty conno-
tations of sexuality—bestial passion, getting dirty, etc.   
Nomi Tang’s Better Than Chocolate. Better Than Chocolate 
is placed over the vulva to mediate between the hand and 
the clitoris. Its bottom half conforms to the pubic mound, 
while its top half is fit for the hand. Its dramatic curves 
connote the body. One of the key features of the Better 
Than Chocolate is that rather than controlling vibration in-
tensity or pattern through buttons, it uses a 4cm touch 
slider: stroking the slider changes vibration. When the de-
vice is in place, the slider is located directly above the clito-
ris (on the top side of the device). Thus, controlling the de-
vice is used with similar gestures and in a similar place to 
stroking the clitoris itself. Sex expert Cory Silverberg (per-
sonal communication) describes this design technique as 
“kinaesthetic onomatopoeia,” because its user interface 
mimics the physical action it augments. In this way, Better 
Than Chocolate introduces another reinterpretation of the 
organic, but through its interactive vocabulary and not just 
its form.  
Better Than Chocolate’s ergonomics are clever, but also 
inflexible; that is, the device won’t fit well with any other 
part of the body, or in any other orientation than the single 
intended one; of all the designs, it is arguably the most 
striking in its visual form—it looks like a cross between a 
medical device and a sculpture. Its implied subject is a solo 
female. Better Than Chocolate constrains the user to a sin-
gle (albeit very clever) use—clitoral stimulation. With its 
clever name and formal beauty, it would make a nice gift, 
again proposing that masturbation can be sophisticated and 
tasteful as well as immediately pleasurable. In this way, like 
the Freestyle, it also rejects stigmas about masturbation. 
Taken as a group, several themes emerge. All three designs 
are tasteful and sophisticated. Though “pleasure objects” 
(as designer Lelo puts it), they are not explicit. They come 
in feminine colors, look like cosmetic products, and merely 
allude to their function. Their names are playful and girlie 
or pretentious—but not kinky or raunchy. All are made with 
body safe materials—and heavily marketed as such. They 
not only resemble consumer electronics, but they are made 
using their manufacturing processes [3]. They are expensive 
and they look expensive. Their subject is a classy and so-
phisticated woman who attends to her sexual needs like 
other body needs, say, skincare or feminine hygiene. Sex, 
then, is not special or hidden; it is just another aspect of the 
body needing care, and sexual taboos don’t even seem to 
exist, or ever have existed, in this world.  
Group 2: Traditional Sex Toys 
We now turn to two more traditional designs, which pro-
pose different different sexual subjects. 
VixSkin Johnny. The Johnny is spectacularly literal: it has 
an anatomically modeled glans, veins, circumcision scars, a 
wrinkly scrotum, and human skin color. Whereas the three 
preceding toys have a thin soft skin covering an extremely 
firm device, the Johnny is rigid but gives realistically to 
pressure. It is also an unusually large penis: 21cm tall and 
4cm in diameter, made of medical grade materials. At USD 
$126, the Johnny is not cheap, and yet it sells briskly.  
Johnny’s user is someone who straightforwardly wants a 
big penis to play with. In its formal and visual fidelity, it 
seems pornographic. As a dismembered body part, it can be 
used hand-held or with a strap-on. In its literalness, it asks 
users to give up any sense of mystery; it has no pretentions 
to be other than what it is. Its sheer size suggests that some 
people may view it as a sexual challenge: what is it like to 
be penetrated by something so big? It implies a view of 
sexuality that is based around anatomy, athleticism, and an-
imal intensity. It neither denies nor seeks to undermine the 
stigma of sex: it embraces it as a source of heat.  
Maximus Power Stroker Viper. The Maximus is a “beaded 
power masturbator” featuring a black, white, and gray color 
scheme, a symmetrical design, visibly cheap materials and 
construction (indeed, it caught on fire during a lab session). 
The opening in which the penis is to be inserted is white 
plastic with 5mm-long nubs in ordered rows and columns. 
The penis sleeve itself is surrounded by cables with 8mm 
steel bearings on them, which massage the penis. Its 
mechanisms are all visible through its exterior shell. The 
product is inorganic in its design language: its shape, color, 
and materials do not reference the body. Its color scheme, 
material connotations (e.g., steel bearings), perfect rows 
and columns all suggest a mechanical aesthetic.  
This toy suggests a masculine subject, from its masculine 
name to its color scheme and look-under-the-hood aes-
thetic. In calling itself a “masturbator” (as opposed to, say, 
“pleasure object”) it is direct about what it is for. Thus, in 
its product form, semantics, and marketing, this toy asks its 
user to give up tenderness, allusiveness, and femininity. In-
deed, like many machines, it favors functionality over aes-
thetics, and this functionality is well understood, well de-
fined, and very clearly solved: put the penis in the hole, turn 
it on, masturbate, remove and clean. Sexuality seems to be 
an engineering problem with an engineered solution.  
It is not our intention to argue that the theory of sexuality 
inscribed in one category of designs is intrinsically superior 
to that of another. But it certainly is clear that these two 
toys differ from the first grouping of toys. They are much 
more explicitly sexual, understood in the sense of genital 
attraction and stimulation and the pleasures immediately 
associated with them. Both of these products represent and 
indulge “base” or “raunchy” notions of sexuality.  
Discussion of Critiques 
Obviously, sexual subject positions are not created solely 
by the sex toy industry. Sociocultural norms have a lot to 
say about how we understand sexuality. Sex toys reify these 
norms in concrete and specific ways, which relate to but are 
also distinct from sexual norms presented in Sunday ser-
mons, porn movies, advice columns, therapy sessions, and 
so on. In the west, there are many taboos surrounding our 
understanding of sexuality: the notion that sex is shameful 
and should be kept private is pervasive. Much of sexual 
practice, especially visible in consensual BDSM, involves 
exploring the sexual power of taboos—that which is forbid-
den becomes especially hot. Johnny and Maximus both po-
sition themselves within such a sexual subjectivity.  
What becomes clear in contrast is that the new paradigm 
toys do not. They associate themselves with non-sexual 
forms of body care (and increasingly they are showing up in 
body care aisles of department stores, where one would 
never find Johnny), which they define in allusive and 
vaguely positive ways: “pleasure,” “feeling sexy,” “life-
style.” As critics, we are concerned with alienation, how 
products reify ideologies that alienate us from goods that 
are rightfully our own. As sex positive feminists, we view 
traditional sexual morality as having alienated us from sex-
ual pleasures that are rightfully ours. But the politics here 
are complex. We welcome the new paradigm toys for their 
celebration of sexual pleasure, and they can be (and fre-
quently are) read as exemplars of sex positive feminism.  
But these toys can also be read as a form of denial: for they 
deny that their users are subject to sexual taboo, and by ex-
tension they also deny both the political imperative to resist 
repressive sexual ideologies (or suggest that by buying 
these one already is), and also, perversely, the sexual pleas-
ures of transgressing them. Moreover, they frame their de-
nial in a classist way, where high-class sexuality (reflected 
in the pricing, naming, and taste of the toys) is barely rec-
ognizable as sex, and by implication not subject to social 
powers that govern sex, while (by implication) low-class 
sexuality is raunchy sex and thereby subject to social cen-
sure. Such a reading suggests that the new paradigm sex 
toys can be read as regressive, reinforcing both a social 
class system and the social control of sexual life—just not 
for those who have the income to buy a Form 6. We will 
not try to resolve the progressive vs. regressive readings of 
these toys here, but we hope we have demonstrated that de-
signers design subjects as well as objects, and that analysis 
helps us get at some of the sociopolitical consequences of 
that design.  
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our empirical study was designed to help us understand 
sexual subjectivities: our research question was not, which 
toys did users like?, but rather, how did users express them-
selves as sexual subjects through their interactions with 
these toys? Linking back to the theory summarized earlier, 
we focus here on participants’ perceptiveness, social mean-
ing-making, and boundary-drawing.  
Perceptiveness 
Though study participants obviously made use of their per-
ceptual abilities to notice the objective features of toys—
colors, shape, texture—such characterizations only infre-
quently appear in their words. Instead, the focus of their 
perceptions was on the fit of toys in their lifeworlds, and 
objective features of the toys, rather than being seen in and 
of themselves, were raised in a more subjective sense. A 
simple example of this is how subjects articulated size.  
The pocket vibrator like it could be hung, it could carry that 
around in a purse, you could almost carry that around in 
those little itty bitty like go to a bar purses. [F, 24, 
heterosexual, Y] 
So on the side of my bed I have a little box… And it’s a 
really nice box and I’m never like oh like I have to hide this. 
And oh so when I’m shopping for one I look for something 
that’s going to fit in there. [F, 24, heterosexual, Y] 
[Note: the annotation after each quote refers respectively to 
gender (M/F/GQ [gender queer]), age, orientation (subject’s 
own self-description), and whether or not they have used 
sex toys in their personal life (Y/N).]  
In both quotes, the objective quality is size, but this quality 
is understood in relation to other artifacts in the toy’s an-
ticipated ecology, here the containers that participants 
imagine themselves putting the toys in. These evaluations 
tacitly imply intentions (e.g., portability and making avail-
able) and social predispositions (e.g., the need for discre-
tion).  
Of course, like any other design, a sex toy is meant to be 
used, and participants’ commentary on toys showed some 
specific ways that people anticipate use: 
I don’t like vibrating things because the motors make them 
sound like they’re always screaming. I don’t want to have 
something inside of me that’s yelling unless it’s yelling in 
pleasure. [M, 22, homosexual, Y] 
You know, if you’re masturbating or having some sort of 
sex, do you really want to change the batteries like 
midstream? It just makes everything unsexy. [F, 30, lesbian, 
Y] 
There seems to be too much of an imitation of the penis, 
and the penis…doesn’t do that much. So mimicking the 
penis is not very imaginative because it doesn’t really get 
you what females really want or need. [M, 26, straight, Y] 
A range of sexual norms are articulated in these quotes: that 
vibrators should not be too loud, that sexual activity is op-
timally experienced as a flow, and that sex toys should be 
imaginatively designed. Yet none of these norms is “natu-
ral” or “animal”; all of them are situated in everyday social 
life. Sociologist William Simon writes, “Desire is the 
scripting of potential futures … drawing upon the scripting 
of the past desire as experienced in the contingent present. 
Desire, in the fullness of its implicit ambiguity, can be de-
scribed as the continuing production of the self” [38, 
p.139]. These comments do not merely reference such 
scripts, as if the scripts were already whole and stored 
somewhere: rather, they enact and embody those scripts. 
So, for example, the participant is not saying that a noisy 
vibrator would probably turn her off were it to be intro-
duced into a hypothetical sexual situation; instead, it is al-
ready turning her off in the moment she is saying it—even 
in the lab. Nor does this scripting end with the sex act: 
I’d be worried about getting water and moisture in here…. 
that’s like my number one thing is can I clean it…. I look 
for nice, solid, something that says it’s waterproof that you 
can submerge the entire object in water because then I 
know the entire surface is able to be cleaned. [F, 28, 
straight, Y] 
When I [have] money I will get the ones that are $100 or so 
and you just toss it in the…dishwasher…. [Y]ou wash them 
like that, and you can use them without having to go 
through the steps of putting a condom on and cleaning it 
out. I think mine is starting to stain now, even though I use 
a condom…so I think yeah, that’s a good criteria. [M, 22, 
homosexual, Y] 
These comments focus on hygiene, which is a practical 
consideration for sex toys. But hygiene is a culturally spe-
cific activity [35,44]. Thus, hygiene is not an afterthought, 
but primary (“my number one thing”); hygiene justifies 
spending the money to get in the range where it is dish-
washable—a culturally specific sexual hygeine practice if 
ever there was one.  
These three sets of examples (toy size and its place in eve-
ryday life, anticipated uses, and concerns about hygiene) 
make clear that toys are never interpreted in terms of “just 
sex.” This helps explain why the designerly toys—which 
situate themselves in relation to personal care and pleas-
ure—are more desirable; they speak to a more holistic soci-
osexual subject. The one negative comment (that VixSkin is 
too literal) indicated that the toy is not legible beyond sex 
acts. We also see here that participants’ imaginative explo-
ration of the toys is temporally structured (to be carried and 
stored; to be used; to be cleaned up). Such characterizations 
are compatible with people’s understandings of intimacy 
[28] and experience itself [24]. The toys’ meanings say as 
much about the participants as it does about the toys them-
selves. Yet our participants did not use the language of 
critical theory; although in our critiques we discussed ide-
ology, false pleasures, semantics, inscribed users, etc., such 
issues seldom explicitly came up with the users. Yet user 
comments that express or respond to sexual norms do 
bridge the two discourses, as we see in the following sec-
tions. 
Social Meaning-Making 
The theory of self as an outward-facing sexual subject out-
lined earlier this paper emphasizes the role of intersubjec-
tive experience as an input to and outcome of our sexuali-
ties. We saw plenty of evidence that intersubjective experi-
ence is central to how participants think about toys:  
My partner and I for a really long time … didn’t use sex 
toys because it wasn’t necessary…. It wasn’t until we had 
been together for a while that we were like, hey, let’s throw 
something else into the mix. [F, 30, lesbian, Y] 
It’s just kind of one more thing for me to offer my partner 
or myself… Yeah it’s just kind of enhancing what I’m able 
to give her [F, 22, lesbian, Y] 
If I’m looking for something for me and my partner, then we 
pick something that we’re both going to like, and her tastes 
are a little bit different than mine, so we…compromise. [F, 
30, lesbian, Y] 
Sex toys here are meaningful inasmuch as they enhance or 
mediate their sexual partnership with another. Each speaker 
has a collaborative, not individual, relation to the toy. This 
sort of concrete interaction defines the self as a subject [27]. 
As [32, p.204] writes, “embodied subjects develop direction 
and purpose on the basis of the practical engagements they 
have with their surroundings and through the intentionality 
they develop as a result of the situatedness of embodied ex-
istence.” The subject’s practical engagements are not lim-
ited to those between partners; our bodies are also socially 
positioned. The presentation and interpretation of our bod-
ies is restrained by external forces [7,32]. One external 
force is body norms, as the following quotes exemplify: 
The problem with things like this is the belts are not 
made…for people who are fat. [GQ, 21, Lesbian, Y] 
The sex toy assumes a normative weight, and when the par-
ticipant falls outside of it, she feels “fat.” Quotes like these 
help bridge to the critiques, because they so clearly point to 
ideological issues (here, norms of slenderness as beauty).   
It’s not adjustable in any way, so for a man to get full 
pleasure out of that, he has to be a particular size not any 
bigger not any smaller. [F, 28, Straight, Y] 
Here again hegemonic norms are foregrounded. Penis size 
is meaningful, frequently linked to notions of masculinity, 
self-esteem, and racism (e.g., the perceived threat or special 
appeal of the stereotypically well-endowed black man). Our 
bodies are not merely biological but are “inscribed, marked, 
engraved by social pressures external to them” [17], and our 
subjects fluently understood such inscriptions. 
Shame, implied in both of the size quotes above, is an in-
tersubjective emotion, defined as the reaction when one 
sees oneself through the eyes of another in a negative way 
[23]. In addition to being ashamed of body properties, peo-
ple can also be ashamed of its needs or pleasures: 
I think that a lot of my friends and I would much more go 
for something smaller; something more compact something 
that you could hide. [F, 24, heterosexual, Y] 
I recently found out my friends would find these in their 
parents’ rooms, their mothers’ rooms. The divorced 
mothers, and I think everyone has that dirty little secret. 
[M, 22, homosexual, Y] 
the cat actually found this in my sister’s room. Yeah, she 
had gone away to college and like the cat was playing with 
it for a good month or so and my mom came home and was 
like, ‘What is this?’… If I knew what I know now back then, 
I would have not thought it was funny but disgusting. [M, 
22, homosexual, Y] 
These quotes suggest three ways vibrators and masturbation 
are social: by involving a partner, inscribing social norms 
(and provoking personal reactions), and causing embar-
rassment/amusement when discovered. Social structures—
from body ideals to racism—are part of the toy, and so the 
toys not only bear the capacity for erotic arousal and inti-
mate creativity, but also pride/shame, disgust, indignation, 
and hilarity. Moreover, none of these perceptions or reac-
tions are mutually incompatible; the same person can be 
subjected to and become subjects of any or all of them. An 
analytic understanding of such a complex response benefits 
from a conceptual vocabulary that can account for the co-
presence of diverse selves (qua subjects) as well as the 
complex enactments and performances that they occasion in 
different social situations. In such a view, it becomes clear 
why the more designerly toys, with their more nuanced se-
mantics, provide more room for expressive agency (e.g., 
most people would presumably rather be discovered with a 
Form 6 than a VixSkin Johnny).  
Boundary-Drawing 
We also wanted to explore the language of acceptance or 
rejection of sex toys to understand what they reveal about 
the self and its boundaries as a sexual subject. We begin 
with several rejections of sex toys: 
it’s lime green and purple so like I’m already putting 
something unnatural inside my body. [F, 24, heterosexual; 
Y] 
I don’t know if I like the size of it, and it’s really hard also 
so I don’t know if I would enjoy putting it in any holes 
because it might end up hurting me. [M, 22, homosexual, 
Y] 
She hates this material. She says it like absorbs bacteria 
[…], and over time it will discolor. [F, 28, straight, Y] 
In each of these quotes, the relationship between the toy 
and the body is extremely intimate, as if the toy is a candi-
date to become a part of the body. Theorist Julia Kristeva 
proposed the concept of the abject to refer to objects in the 
world that challenge the borders between our bodies and the 
outside world: body excretions, blood, sweat, corpses, vom-
it, etc. [21]. Our repulsion to the abject is protective mecha-
nism, a way of reinforcing the boundaries between self and 
outside when those borders are threatened. As Body theorist 
Blackman writes, the abject “demarcates a number of key 
boundaries, such as the inside and outside, the natural and 
the cultural, and the mind and the body…. [The body] is 
engendered or brought into being through two key 
concepts: individuation and separation.” [6]  
It is interesting to see that dislike was often specifically ex-
pressed as a threat, and rejection in terms of self-protection; 
sex toy likes and dislikes are often far stronger than mere 
preference statements, e.g., for flavors of ice cream. Our 
application of the abject also suggests specifically where 
participants perceive their own borders between what could 
be accepted into the self versus those that could not. In the 
above quotes, the unnatural, the physically large, and the 
discolored are all offered as boundaries. Yet as Kristeva’s 
theory suggests, boundaries are movable. The same physi-
cally large toy that is intimidating to one is an object of cu-
riosity or even a sexual challenge to another. The following 
quotes all explore boundary reactions, in which some aspect 
of the toy is threatening, but rather than rejecting it, the par-
ticipant seeks ways to accommodate it: 
But it seems like you would have to really lubricate well 
just because it like, it kind of like pulls. The texture of it 
kind of pulls so you’d have to definitely makes sure that you 
use lots of lube so there’s no like pulling or tearing. [F, 22, 
lesbian, Y] 
this one seems like it would be a little too much because I 
think like too much vibration can kind of just be numbing 
[M, 20, homosexual, Y] 
So if it’s any bigger than that then I probably wouldn’t 
want it at least not for penetration purposes. [F, 23, 
heteroflexible, Y] 
Size, texture, and vibration are all qualities that in some 
measure are acceptable and in other measures are rejected. 
Along the borders, then, toys perceived as challenging (as 
opposed to outright threatening) can be managed, e.g., with 
more lubricant or by changing its use. A possible outcome 
of management efforts is an increasingly inclusive and 
more specific drawing of the boundaries, which appear to 
reflect a certain amount of self-awareness: 
I would rather have a lot, a larger range of vibrations 
rather than a larger range of pulsing. [F, 30, lesbian, Y] 
For vaginal stimulation it’s not really a big deal; but for 
clitoral stimulation I have to have a big range…just so I 
can have a good variation [F, 23, heteroflexible, Y] 
These are not “natural” embodied reactions but rather 
learned and practiced ones. Each speaker has a developed 
sensibility regarding the nature of vibration and its tactual 
effects on her body. That the toy challenges boundaries—
not only physically as body penetration, but somatically as 
an extended body part—helps explain why sex toys are 
greeted with such extreme reactions—desire, repulsion—
and giving rise to the sober skill of managing the toy’s 
power in one’s own bodily ecosystem.  
Discussion of Empirical Findings 
The critical perspective was strong at analyzing links be-
tween design choices to sociocultural issues, e.g., how toys 
embody and replicate class norms and ideologies, how toys 
participate in activist challenges to traditional morality, and 
how sexual experiences can be offered up as/in products. 
The empirical findings also provided linkages between spe-
cific design choices and experiences, but in more concrete 
terms. They revealed how design choices exposed (or 
pushed) the boundaries of participant sexuality: what was 
desirable, what was possible under what conditions, and 
what must be rejected outright both from a physical per-
spective (e.g., too big, wrong color) and from a social per-
spective (e.g., too shameful to acknowledge, reifies regres-
sive body ideals). The findings also reveal how sexuality 
relates to other parts of life, e.g., storage and hygiene. The 
emphatic reactions emphasized how much these toys are 
literally incorporated, taken into the body, and how power-
ful, for better and for worse, that move is. The body is 
changed, both to oneself and to the social world. This 
change is a powerful experience to the self; the discovery 
that one’s partner (or mother!) has been subjected to such 
change is socially significant; as is the realization that one’s 
body is ineligible for such change (e.g., one is “too fat” or 
“too small”).  
SUBJECTIVITIES OF INFORMATION 
Subjectivity theory, developed in the context of postmod-
ernism, might come across as radical, proposing a “frag-
mented self” that lacks unity or coherence, in stark contrast 
to our intuitive sense of ourselves as unified wholes. On the 
other hand, the idea that our sense of self is shaped by our 
participation in social structures (parent-child, teacher-
student, partner-partner), and that we have some agency in 
how we embody and perform such roles, seems intuitive. 
We argue for subjectivity theory in HCI not in a metaphysi-
cal sense, as if to assert that “subjectivities of information” 
somehow corresponds better to reality as the “hidden truth” 
about how we “really are.” Rather, we argue that this for-
mulation has pragmatic benefits for research and design.  
The strength of this theory is its ability to account for the 
mutability of selfhood, as it negotiates the boundaries of 
internal experience and intention and our (designed) envi-
ronments and social reality. If we view the self as unified 
and even fixed, it limits design to “supporting” and “aug-
menting” existing capabilities (and much of HCI literature 
uses these terms). If we can understand the mechanisms by 
which selves change—as embodied social beings situated in 
sociotechnical environments and practices—then we can 
look beyond supporting and augmenting towards the hope 
and the ideal of social change. From environmental sustain-
ability to social media, and from participatory design to ac-
tion research and feminist HCI, the field has been aspiring 
to contribute to social change. In doing so, it has already 
begun to explore many humanistic concepts and method-
ologies. For this reason, we believe that many in the field 
are already embracing, if tacitly, some version of subjectiv-
ities of information, from Turkle’s Life on the Screen to re-
search on the “quantified self.” Our hope here is to offer an 
argument, a set of concepts, an example, as a provocation 
that helps frame and consolidate these developments.  
Near the beginning of this essay, we argued that this theory 
provides a tight analytic coupling between specific design 
decisions and particular socio-subjective experiences; a vo-
cabulary to reason about the ways that we can design sub-
jects as well as interfaces, products, and services (without 
denying human agency enacted in subjectivities); and a 
means to get at design aimed at cultivating and transform-
ing, rather than merely supporting or extending, human 
agency. We conclude by returning to these three claims.  
Linking Design Choices with User Experiences 
Aristotle in his Poetics exemplifies an analysis that links 
formal features of literary genres (e.g., tragedy and epic) to 
subjective experiences and social significances, e.g., how 
the form of a tragic reversal in a tragedy causes feelings of 
pity and fear in the audience, which then purge them of 
their own emotions, reestablishing their rationality. Our 
critical analysis likewise seeks to understand how the prod-
uct semantics of certain contemporary sex toys cohere with 
certain particular kinds of experiences, themselves situated 
in certain social meanings. More specifically, we followed 
experts in distinguishing between two categories of sex 
toys—earlier adult novelty products vs. more recent “des-
ignerly” lifestyle accessories—to interpret how the designs 
project subject positions as part of their meaning.  
In our empirical study, we gained a sense of individuals 
perceive, interpret, and tell stories about sex toys. A com-
mon statement involved a participant pointing to something 
specific about the design (a shape, color, texture) and then 
relating it to experience (how it would feel, its implications 
for hygiene, how one might hide it). Such statements can 
add up to a poetics in their own right. Thus, even though we 
view subject positions as inscribed in objects and available 
to researchers analytically through interpretation, and we 
view subjectivities as part of human experiences and avail-
able to research via empirical studies, they need not be in-
commensurate. To the extents that these two modes of 
analysis overlap increases confidence in the findings.  
Designing Subjects as Well as Interfaces 
Both our critical and empirical studies pointed to two dif-
ferent sexual subjectivities. Earlier sex toys propose a raun-
chy and transgressive sexual subject, who finds pleasure in 
genital attraction/sensation in precisely the ways that are 
taboo in traditional morality. The toys construct this subjec-
tivity through their blunt visual and functional appeal to sex 
acts, including literal replication of anatomy, pornographic 
packaging, overt problem-solving functionalism, as well as 
more subtle features, such as vibrator controls that face 
away from a woman (i.e., so her partner can control them). 
As sex positive feminism gained momentum over the dec-
ades, however, an alternative sexual subject was offered: a 
body-conscious woman, who takes care of her physical 
needs with taste, discrimination, and consumer choice. The 
designerly sex toys speak to this subject, in their forms, ma-
terials, and marketing. Such features include more abstract 
shapes that connote but do not denote sexual organs, femi-
nine color palettes instead of skin tones (especially bright 
pinks and purples), formal allusions to cosmetics (e.g., the 
silver band on the Freestyle), emphasis on health (e.g., body 
safe materials), and euphemistic marketing. 
It is important to stress that any individual can choose be-
tween these subjectivities, embracing one, the other, both, 
or neither—and that this choice can be made again and 
again, changing over time. One can be in the mood for 
raunchy and transgressive sex one day, and be in the mood 
for something more sensual and synesthetic then next. It is 
also possible to start predominantly in one place and then to 
change one’s tastes, or form new desires, over time. De-
signs—and the images of sexual life inscribed within 
them—can help effect such changes.  
Cultivating and Transforming Human Agency 
Dewey frequently reminds us in his writings that humans 
are organisms, that we adapt to our environments. As ubiq-
uitous computing, Internet of Things, and wearable comput-
ing becomes a reality, we are constructing new environ-
ments and human organisms will adapt. Part of this means 
the acquisition of new skills of perception and a precise 
conceptual vocabulary to grasp and to express them: no one 
is born with a capacity to explicate a sex toy feature’s 
physical, sexual, romantic, social, and ideological conse-
quences (e.g., reification of body weight norms and penis 
size). Part of it also means researchers and designers im-
proving their own conceptual grasp: for example, the way 
that our subjects perceived and interpreted the significance 
of toys as (prospectively) part of their bodies would seem to 
raise potentially generative concepts about wearable tech-
nologies.  
Our study of sex toys, which comprises expert interview 
studies, critical analysis of toys, and empirical studies of 
sexual experiences, has helped us grasp not only the emerg-
ing paradigm of designerly sex toys compared to what came 
before it in design historical terms, but more importantly to 
understand its tremendous range of significance: from in-
tensely personal experiences to forms of public activism, 
literal orgasms to public shame, product design history to 
third wave feminism, and law enforcement to pop music. 
Each of these is an opening to forms of agency: to try out a 
new sexual experience, to become active in sexual politics, 
to jump into sex toy design, to become more sex educated 
and/or an educator. It is not our position that design alone 
causes such transformations, but it is our position that de-
sign can contribute meaningfully to such transformations, 
and subjectivity theory, and a critical-empirical research 
methodology, can help us understand them better. Because 
designers in HCI are hoping to contribute such transforma-
tions, we believe a reconceptualization of the user as a sub-
jectivity of information will be salutary.  
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